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ABSTRACT
Generic drug utilization has risen dramatically, from 19% of scrips in 1984 to 47% in 2001, thus
bringing significant direct dollar savings. Generic drug use may also yield indirect savings if it
lowers the average price of those brand-name drugs that are still purchased. Prior work indicates -
and we confirm - that generic competition does not induce brand-name producers to lower prices.
However, consumer choices between generic and brand-name drugs could affect the average price
of those brand-name drugs that are purchased.
We use nationally representative panel data on drug utilization and costs for the years 1996-2001 to
examine how the share of an individual's prescriptions filled by generics affects his average out-of-
pocket cost for brand-name drugs. Our principal finding is that a higher generic scrip share lowers
average  brand-name  prices  to  consumers,  presumably  because  consumers  are  more  likely  to
substitute generics when the price gap is great. This effect is substantial: a 10% increase in the





Stony Brook, NY 11794
john.rizzo@stonybrook.edu
Richard Zeckhauser





richard_zeckhauser@harvard.edu  3 
 INTRODUCTION   
  Generic drugs have dramatically increased their presence in the pharmaceutical marketplace; in 
2000, 47% of prescriptions were filled with generic drugs, up from 19% in 1984.
1   Generic substitution, 
beyond saving money directly, can have indirect effects on the prices paid by both consumers and health 
plans for those brand-name drugs that are still purchased.  This could happen in either of two ways: (1) 
brand-name manufacturers could change their prices in response to competition, or (2) consumers could 
disproportionately substitute generic drugs for the more expensive (or less expensive) among the brand-
name drugs, which would lower (or raise) the average purchase price of brand-name drugs. 
The competitive and pricing consequences of generic substitution affect consumers, health plans, 
and drug firms.  Understanding these effects also helps to assess legislative efforts, such as the Hatch-
Waxman Act of 1984, which decreased approval times for generics, and for understanding what measures 
might best curb spiraling pharmaceutical costs without sacrificing health.   
Prior work
2 indicates that brand-name producers do not lower their prices in response to 
competition with generics. Apparently, drug firms prefer to maintain price while ceding market share to 
their generic competitors, so that our first indirect effect is not important.  These empirical observations 
are consistent with a two-tiered market, in which price-sensitive consumers switch to the cheaper generics 
while brand loyalists stick with the higher-priced branded drugs.   
  However, no past work considers our second indirect effect -- the implicit tradeoffs consumers 
make between price and perceived quality when choosing among brand-name and generic drugs, tradeoffs 
                                                 
1  Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.  “A Century of Progress.”  Washington, DC:  Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (2001). 
2 Caves, Richard E., Whinston, Michael D., and  Hurwitz, Mark A.  “Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (1991), pp. 1-48;  Frank, Richard G.,  and  
Salkever,  David S.   “Generic Entry and the Pricing of  Pharmaceuticals.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 6 
(1997): 75-90; Grabowski, Henry G., and Vernon, John M.  “Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals 
after the 1984 Drug Act”. Journal of Law and Economics 35 (1992): 331-350.  
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that will affect the average price of the brand-name drugs they still purchase. We study this issue by 
examining the relationship between the share of a consumer’s prescriptions that are filled by generics, 
which we label generic scrip share, and the average price for brand-name drugs purchased by that 
consumer.  Though we focus primarily on prices to consumers -- their copayments (copays) -- we are also 
concerned with prices to health plans and insurers. 
A priori, it is not clear whether greater generic scrip share – which we often abbreviate as scrip 
share -- should be associated with higher or lower average brand-name prices.  A number of plausible 
hypotheses would predict that a higher generic scrip share would raise the average price that consumers 
pay for brand-name drugs.  This might occur because: I. Consumers’ costs differ because their health 
plans use different copay amounts.  Those consumers in geographic areas facing higher copays on average 
purchase more generics, and also incur higher copays for the brand-name drugs they purchase.  II. The 
prices of brand-name drugs are thought to be correlated with quality, and consumers choose quality over 
cost, particularly since they pay only a small percent of cost.  III. More expensive brand-name drugs tend 
to be the most heavily advertised, which might make brand loyalty particularly strong for the most 
expensive of the branded drugs.  Any of these three hypotheses predicts a positive relationship between 
generic scrip share and consumers’ costs for their brand-name drugs. 
The principal competing hypothesis is that when choosing between generics and brand-name 
drugs, consumers are primarily motivated by saving money.  They will switch to a generic drug when the 
savings relative to the brand-name price will be high.  This price matters hypothesis predicts that a greater 
generic scrip share would lead to lower average brand-name drug prices to consumers.       
Two other players strongly influence drug purchases, physicians and insurers.  Doctors play a 
central role in prescription decisions.  We assume that they are loyal agents for their patients, particularly 
since they have no financial interest in the drugs selected.   Health insurers have less direct control over     5 
prescription choices, but they establish insurance plans that influence those choices.  For example, in 
running their formularies, insurers may induce consumers to purchase generics by using low copays for 
such drugs.  Insurers have a particularly strong incentive to encourage patients to buy generic versions of 
expensive brand-name drugs.  Whatever the instrument, insurers provide incentives that affect the nature 
and extent of consumer switching from brand-names to generics.  This in turn will affect the average price 
that they and their consumers pay for brand-name drugs. Plans may also pressure the physicians who 
work for them or are on their approved list to prescribe generic drugs where possible.   
Below, we shall also investigate how generic scrip share affects the average price that health plans 
pay for brand-name drugs.  If health plans structure their formularies and copays so that the more 
expensive brand-name drugs are generally more expensive to consumers, we would expect savings for 
consumers to translate into savings for health plans. 
On the other hand, it is quite possible that plans might not save money even if consumers do.  
Consider two possibilities.  First, there may be many expensive drugs, such as new and patented 
introductions, that are made available with low copays because there are no generic substitutes.  
Ultimately, health plans are agents for consumers, and even if they are profit maximizers, market forces 
push them toward faithful agency.  Given that, expensive brand-name drugs that have no substitutes will 
have moderate copays.  Second, within a copay category, higher priced brand-name drugs may offer or 
may be perceived as offering higher quality.  If so, quality-concerned consumers will buy generics 
primarily to replace the cheaper brand-name drugs in each category.  For the insurer, this represents a 
form of adverse selection; it pays disproportionately for higher-priced brand-name drugs.  In that case, 
consumer cost savings from the mix of brand-name drugs purchased would not translate into plan cost 
savings.   6 
  We conduct our analysis using a nationally representative panel of data on drug utilization and 
costs for the years 1996-2001.  We compute the effect of changes in the shares of generic scrips on the 
average out-of-pocket cost for brand-name drugs purchased by a consumer with health insurance, and the 
net cost paid by the insurer.
3   
We wish to determine how consumers’ generic drug purchases affect the average prices of the 
brand-name drugs they also purchase.  To forestall speculation that other factors may be more important, 
we mention two more results, which are reported in Appendix B.  First, leaving aside consequences that 
work through consumers’ own shares of generic purchases, we find no evidence that market-level 
measures of generic scrip share affect average brand price.  This finding -- that firms do not respond on a 
geographic basis to generic scrip share -- complements the work cited above suggesting that firms do not 
lower price.  It also indicates that the behavior of drug firms does not explain our primary result. 
Second, if brand drugs that face generic competition tend to be more expensive, an association 
between generic scrip share and lower average brand price might not reflect any systematic consumer 
choice, but merely that generics replace relatively expensive brand-name drugs.  We examined this issue 
by looking at a representative sample of commonly dispensed brand-name drugs with and without generic 
substitutes.  We found that brand-name drugs with generic substitutes were generally less expensive both 
to plans, and on an out-of-pocket basis to consumers.  This factor alone would suggest that a higher 
generic scrip share would be associated with higher brand-name prices.  Thus, an empirical finding of a 
negative relationship between generic scrip share and brand name prices would suggest that other factors 
– such as consumer choice in response to price – are at work.  
  The remainder of this paper is divided into six parts.  Part I provides descriptive background, and 
reviews the evidence on generic scrip share and the price of brand-name drugs.  Our conceptual model of 
how consumers choose whether to buy brand-name or generic drugs is presented in Part II.   Part III 
                                                 
3  Insurer costs here are the costs paid by the insurer, net of any copays or coinsurance paid by the consumer.   7 
presents our hypotheses.  Part IV describes the data and empirical models to be estimated.  The results are 
presented in Part V.  Part VI summarizes the results and their policy implications.  
 
I.  GENERIC SCRIP SHARE AND BRAND-NAME DRUG PRICES 
Background 
Pharmaceuticals account for a significant share of health care expenditures in the United States, 
ranking third after hospital care expenditures and expenditures on physician services.  In 2000, for 
example, hospital care accounted for 32.8% of health care expenditures in the United States, physician 
services accounted for 22.8%, and 9.7% of expenditures – nearly $122 billion, or $450 per person -- were 
incurred for pharmaceuticals 
4 
In absolute terms, pharmaceutical costs quadrupled between 1990 and 2002,
5 but also rose as a 
share of overall health care expenditures. Drug expenditures accounted for 5.1% of total health care 
expenditures in 1980, and 5.9% by 1995.  They then exploded to 9.7% by 2000.
6 Some combination of 
increases in prices, growth in volume, and changes in the mix of pharmaceutical products explains this 
dramatic growth.  In recent years, contrary to popular perceptions, price increases played a small role in 
explaining the growth in pharmaceutical expenditures.   As Berndt
7 notes: 
... from 1987 through 1994, price growth at 6.1 percent annually was responsible for slightly more 
than half of the 11.9 percent sales growth.  However, from 1994 through 2000, price growth 
accounted for only about one-fifth of revenue growth (2.7 percentage points out of 12.9 percent).... 
in recent years, price increases have been relatively less important, and instead, quantity growth -- 
greater utilization of incumbent and new products-- has been the primary driver of increased 
spending.   
 
                                                 
4 Berndt, Ernst R.  “Pharmaceuticals in U.S. Health Care: Determinants of Quantity and  Price.”  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 16 no. 4 (2002): 45-66.  
5 Kaiser Family Foundation.  “ Prescription Drug Trends.”  Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation (2004). 
6 See Berndt, supra note 4. 
7 See Berndt, supra note 4, pp. 46-47.   8 
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 created an abbreviated approval process for generic drugs while 
extending the patent length of brand-name drugs.   
… the act increased the proportion of brand-name drugs that face generic competition once their 
patents expire. In 1983, only 35 percent of the top-selling drugs with expired patents (excluding 
antibiotics and drugs approved before 1962) had generic versions available. Today, nearly all do.
8  
 
In addition, changes in state laws and third party payer initiatives have promoted greater use of generic 
drugs, which made up 47% of scrips in 2000.
9   For example, 40 states allow pharmacists to substitute 
generics unless otherwise directed by physicians.
10   Third party payers have changed copay structures to 
encourage consumers to purchase more generics.   
  Despite these policy changes, a number of barriers to greater use of generic drugs in the United 
States persist.
11  Some have argued, for example, that current federal laws governing patent protection and 
intellectual property rights provide excessive patent protection for brand-name drugs, since they allow 
brand-name producers to file additional patents just as their old patents are about to expire, thereby 
extending the life of the initial drug.  Current laws also impose delays on generic competition when patent 
disputes arise.  In addition, brand and generic companies may reach settlements, the terms of which 
include delayed entry of generics.
12   
Another practice, known as “evergreening,” involves repackaging and reformulating a brand-name 
drug as its patent is about to expire.  A common method of evergreening  
                                                 
8 Congressional Budget Office.  “How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry.”  Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office (1998), p. ix. 
9 See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, supra note 1. 
10  Forty-one states also have provisions that consumers must give consent or be informed of any generic substitution See: 
NIHCM Foundation (National Institute for Health Care Management Research and Educational Foundation).   “A Primer: 
Generic Drugs, Patents, and the Pharmaceutical Market Place.”  Washington, DC: NICHM Foundation (2002), p. 23.  
Accessed at: http://www.nihcm.org/GenericsPrimer.pdf.  
11 The discussion in this section draws upon a study of  generic drugs and patents by The NIHCM Foundation, supra note 10, 
to which the reader is referred for further discussion of the issues raised herein.  
12 This practice has, however, attracted scrutiny by government regulators: 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is currently probing whether and when such settlements violate antirust law.  Several 
drug companies have already been required to abide by FTC consent decrees that bar them from making such arrangements.    9 
…is to produce an “extended release” form of a drug whose patent is just about to expire.  These 
new formulations may have to be taken once every few days or even once a week instead of every 
day.  Such new formulations win three years of patent protection (for the new formulation but not 
the “mother drug”). When the patent on the mother drug expires and generics of it become 
available, the brand company wages a marketing campaign to switch users to the extended release 
form of the drug.
13  
    
While these minor changes may confer benefits on some patients, it is also possible that some patients 
may be switched inappropriately to these reformulated drugs, whose prices will remain substantially 
higher than the generics. In addition, brand-name producers have voiced concerns about the 
bioequivalence of generic drugs, and have questioned the quality of their production methods, presumably 
in part to sow doubt among consumers. 
  A provision in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990) raises another 
potential barrier.  This law requires brand-name firms to offer 15% discounts to the program to receive 
federal payments under Medicaid.  But in return the law prohibits state Medicaid programs from 
removing these brand-name drugs from their formularies so long as they continue to offer the discount.  
This leads critics to “allege that this structure prohibits states form evaluating drugs more aggressively 
and undermines the wider use of less expensive generics.”
14  
  The principal instrument discouraging generic use relative to what a fully informed free market 
would produce is widespread insurance for pharmaceutical expenditures.  Under such plans, consumers 
pay only a portion of the cost differential between brand-name and generic drugs, often a quite modest 
portion.  Their larger subsidy gives brand-name drugs a competitive advantage.
15   
Growth in generics relative to brand-name drugs appears to have leveled off in recent years, 
perhaps due to these obstacles.  Between 1996 and 2000, the generic share of total scrips has grown more 
                                                                                                                                                                            
This has led some drug company analysts to speculate that the practice will decline. See NIHCM Foundation, supra note 10, p. 
23. 
13 See NIHCM Foundation, supra note 10, p. 23.  
14  See NIHCM Foundation, supra note 10, p. 25.   10 
slowly, from 43% to 47%.
16                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Price competition 
Generic drugs are typically offered to insurance plans at substantially lower prices than their 
branded counterparts.  Evidence suggests that an initial generic entrant is priced at about 75% of the price 
of its brand-name competitor; with subsequent generic entrants, the prices of generics decline rapidly.
17  
Moreover, managed care organizations and pharmacy benefits management companies negotiate price 
discounts from drug manufacturers.  Thus strong price discounts for generics and the desire to remain in 
good favor with large purchasers such as managed care organizations would seem to create powerful 
incentives for producers of brand-name drugs to compete on price. 
Yet price competition may be affected by a variety of other considerations, including the presence 
of health insurance covering drugs, consumer uncertainty about both the prices and quality of brand-name 
drugs and generics, brand-name advertising, and the costs of drug development. The insurance subsidy 
allows consumers to focus more on quality relative to price than they otherwise would.  Thus, health 
insurance coverage may dampen consumer sensitivity to price, lowering incentives for producers of 
brand-name drugs to compete on price with generics.   
Evidence suggests that neither physicians nor patients are generally knowledgeable about the 
prices of drugs and medical treatments;
18  this could further dampen incentives for producers of branded 
                                                                                                                                                                            
15 An efficient market would offer insurance against needing a drug.  However, where generic substitution was possible, it 
would have the marginal cost of choosing a brand-name drug over a generic borne by the consumer. 
16  See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, supra note 1. 
17 Meier, Markus H.   “The FTC’s Pharmaceutical Industry Cases.”  California Bar Association (2002).  Document available at: 
www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/sections/antitrust/2002-06-26_generic-drug_materials-meier.pdf. 
18 Gaynor,  Martin, and Polachek, Solomon W.  “Measuring Information in the Market: An Application to Physician Services.”  
Southern Economic Journal 60 no. 4 (1994): 815-831;  Hibbard, Judith H., and Weeks, Edward C.  “Consumerism in Health 
Care: Prevalence and Predictors.”  Medical Care 25 no. 11 (1987): 1019-1032;  Hibbard, Judith H., and Weeks, Edward C.  
“Does the Dissemination of Comparative Data on Physician Fees Affect Consumer Use of Services?” Medical Care 27 no. 12 
(1989): 1167-1174;     Silcock J, Ryan M, Bond C, et al. (1997).  “The Cost of Medicines in the United Kingdom: A Survey of 
General Practitioners’ Opinions and Knowledge.”  PharmacoEconomics 11 no. 1 (1997): 56-63. 
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drugs to lower their prices.  Moreover, while generics are touted as being equivalent to their brand-name 
counterparts, consumers may not be able to gauge whether such claims are true, particularly since it is 
often alleged that generics are inferior.  And producers of brand-name drugs – which typically spend 
heavily on marketing efforts – have the incentive to convey messages to consumers that generics offer 
inferior quality.  
Finally, producers of brand-name drugs face far higher production costs than do producers of 
generics, once their very expensive R&D, approval, and marketing costs are factored in.  Moreover, 
brand-name producers typically have a limited number of drugs on the market to recoup the R&D costs, 
including costs for the very large number of potential drugs that never make it to market.  Producers of 
branded drugs tend to maintain prices despite competition from generics, presumably hoping to separate 
the market by elasticity.  To facilitate this separation, they undertake expensive marketing efforts to hold 
onto as many of their brand- loyal customers for as long as possible.                  
Empirical evidence on drug pricing in response to generic scrip share 
To our knowledge, there is no literature on how the share of generic scrips affects the average 
prices of the brand-name pharmaceuticals that are purchased.  However, a number of studies have 
examined a related issue, the effect of generic entry on brand-name prices.  While it is clear that generic 
entrants often capture significant market share,
19 most evidence indicates that generic competition has 
little effect on the prices of brand-name drugs.  Grabowski and Vernon
20 studied 18 drugs that lost patent 
protection between 1983 and 1987, and found that brand-name prices continued to rise faster than 
inflation following generic entry.  Frank and Salkever
21 examined 32 drugs that went off patent between 
1984 and 1987, and determined that brand-name prices increased slightly following generic entry – by 
                                                 
19  See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, supra note 1. 
20  See Grabowski and Vernon, supra note 2. 
21 See Frank and Salkever, supra note 2.   12 
about one extra percentage point for each generic entrant.  Caves et al.
22 examined 30 brand-name drugs 
that went off patent between 1976 and 1987, and found that generic scrip share reduced the prices of 
branded drugs, but only by about 2 percent.  A study by the Congressional Budget Office
23 of 34 drugs 
that lost patent protection after 1991 concluded that the prices of these drugs continued to rise faster than 
inflation following generic entry, thus providing little evidence that such entry promoted price 
competition. 
The lone study finding different results is by Wiggins and Manness,
24 who report substantial price 
reductions among brand-name anti-infective drugs following generic entry.  Some have argued, however, 
that the anti-infective market has unusually vigorous competition (Office of Technology Assessment 
1993; Grabowski and Vernon 1992).
25  
                                                                                                                               
II.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
We begin by considering a situation where consumers or their doctor agents primarily determine 
whether to purchase generic or brand-name drugs.  (In this analysis, we use the terms consumer, 
individual and patient interchangeably.)  The availability of generics affords the consumer greater choice.  
He can tilt the mix of his drug purchases toward cheaper generic equivalents.  Whether he does so will 
depend on any concerns he has that brand-name drugs offer superior quality.  Such concerns will be 
reinforced by advertising efforts by brand-name incumbents.   
                                                 
22  See Caves et al., supra note 2. 
23 See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 8. 
24 Wiggins, Steven N., and  Maness, Robert S. “Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Anti-infectives.”  
Economic Inquiry 42 no. 2 (2004): 247-263.   
25 See Grabowski and Vernon, supra note 2; Office of Technology Assessment. “Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and 
Rewards .”  Washington, DC:  Office of Technology Assessment (1993). 
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Switching costs may also deter the consumer from choosing a generic drug.  These include the 
monetary and time costs of a physician visit to request a change in medication, and the costs of gathering 
information about the availability and suitability of generic substitutes. Switching costs may also include 
a psychic component as well, due perhaps from lingering uncertainty that the generic drug might not be as 
safe or effective; advertising efforts by branded incumbents may reinforce such concerns. 
In markets where generic scrip share is great, switching should be more common.  That is because 
information about generics is likely to be more readily available, and because the greater use of generics 
should decrease transactions costs associated with switching.  For example, physicians will be more aware 
of generics, and pharmacies more likely to carry them.  In essence, we are arguing that the greater 
availability of generic drugs conveys positive externalities to those contemplating a switch to them.  
Our principal concern in this essay is whether greater use of generic drugs by a consumer will 
raise or lower the average price of the brand-name drugs individuals continue to buy. To foster intuition, 
consider a situation where a consumer needs two drugs.  Their respective brand-name versions have 
different copays, and a generic substitute is available for each.  Some exogenous factor has made generics 
relatively more attractive than they were before.  For which of the two brand-name drugs will the 
consumer purchase a generic substitute first?  To answer this question, we must model the factors 
affecting the consumer’s decision to switch from brands to generics.     
  To begin, insurers almost always offer the consumer a lower copay for generic drugs, which 
favors generics.  However, consumers will also consider the quality of the drug, which may be a 
counterbalancing advantage for brand-name drugs.  Drug quality has two components:  (1) the drug’s 
safety and effectiveness for its purpose, and (2) the importance of its purpose.   
Relating to (1), leaving price aside, we would assume that consumers are more likely to buy 
brand-name drugs if they assume that brand-name drugs are substantially safer or more effective than   14 
generic drugs.  This might advantage well-known brands, or drugs that are known to be high-tech 
developments.   Component (2) would suggest that a consumer would be more likely to use a brand-name 
drug than a generic for a life-threatening condition than for a skin rash.  Indeed, survey evidence indicates 
that consumers perceive quality differentials between brand-name drugs and generic substitutes to be 
greater when the drugs are used to treat more serious conditions.
26 
  We denote the two elements of concern as C for copay and Q for quality, where the latter 
incorporates both quality components.  There are two brand-name drugs, denoted by superscripts H and L, 
that respectively have high and low copays.  The terms “brand-name” and “generic” are indicated by the 
subscripts b and g.  To ease exposition, we shall assume that quality is scaled so as to be linear with 
money, and that money and quality are separable and additive elements in the utility function.  Let overall 
wealth be W. 
  An individual’s utility can thus be represented as 
                                (W – C) +  ￿Q ,                                                         (1)                                     
where ￿ represents the shadow value of quality.
27  Since copays are low relative to overall wealth, we 
shall assume that income effects are small and omit W from future expressions.  The critical issue in 
deciding whether to purchase a brand-name or generic drug is how much money will be saved, and how 
much quality will be sacrificed.  If the ratio of savings to sacrifice is great, individuals will tip toward 
generics, and vice versa.  The critical expression, derived from (1), is 
                        (Cb – Cg)/(Qb – Qg)  = ￿i ,                                    (2) 
                                                 
26 For example, Ganther and Kreling report that subjects viewed generic substitution as most risky when treating heart ailments 
(54%) and least risky when treating strep throat (14%). See  Ganther, Julie M., and Kreling, David H. (2000). “Consumer 
Perceptions of Risk and Required Cost Savings for Generic Prescription Drugs.”  Journal of the American Pharmacy 
Association 40 (2000): 378-383. For a review of the literature on this subject, see   Gaither C, Kirking D, Ascione F, et al. 
“Consumer’s Views on Generic Medications.”  Journal of the American Pharmacy Association 41 no. 5 (2001): 729-736. 
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where i indexes consumers.  For individual i, this gives a situation where the cost difference between the 
brand-name and generic drugs is just compensated by the perceived quality differential.  If the ratio on the 
left in (2) exceeds ￿i, consumer i should purchase the generic, whereas the brand-name should be 
purchased if the inequality is reversed.
28 
Consumers with high generic use presumably have a small positive value of ￿; i.e., cost 
differences matter a lot.
29  Our interest is whether such consumers tend to have a brand-name mix that is 
richer or poorer in H (high copay) drugs.  A critical consideration will be the differences in the perceived 
qualities of H and L drugs and their generic substitutes.  Take the case where the brand-generic quality 
differential for H drugs is perceived to be similar to that for L drugs.  Then the expression in (2) will be 
larger for H drugs than for L drugs because absolute out-of-pocket cost differentials between high-cost 
brand-name drugs and their generic equivalents will tend to be larger for the consumer,
30 which makes it 
more likely to be greater than the critical value ￿ for any particular consumer. This situation will continue 
to be true if some consumers perceive greater quality differences between brand-name and generic drugs 
than do others.  In either case, looking across individuals, there will be proportionally more generic 
substitution for H drugs.  More money is saved, but the quality sacrifice is little or no greater. 
  Consider now a situation where H drugs are assumed by consumers to offer noticeably higher 
quality.  This perception could apply for a number of reasons:  (1) Consumers are used to thinking that 
higher priced items are of higher quality.  (2) Drug companies – thinking in elasticity terms -- may charge 
more for high quality drugs, including those dealing with dreaded conditions, particularly for those for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
27 Even if individuals have strictly convex indifference curves, they will be operating locally as if there is a linear tradeoff 
between money and quality. 
28 Note, when there is no difference in perceived quality the denominator is 0, the ratio is infinite, and the generic is purchased 
if its out-of-pocket price is below that for the brand-name drug. 
29 High generic drug use could also reflect a situation where a consumer saw little or no quality difference between brand-name 
and generic drugs.  In that case, as when ￿ is small, price is the primary driver of generic drug purchases. 
30 This will be true if  as seems reasonable, the higher-priced brand drugs involve higher copays than the lower-priced brand 
drugs, but there is little difference in the copays associated with their respective generic equivalents.  
   16 
which generics substitutes have different formulations or are believed to be inferior.  (3) Drug companies 
do more direct-to-the-consumer marketing of higher-priced drugs.  If health plans impose higher copays 
for drugs that cost them more, then higher copays will associated with higher quality. 
  In assessing quality and cost tradeoffs, the critical comparison is between the ratio in (2) for 
brand-name drug H and brand-name drug L.  That comparison is: 








L)        (3) 
Our formulation assumes the consumer has different views of the qualities of the four drugs involved, 
which are indexed by b and g and also by H and L.  (Though we allow the copay for the generic substitute 
to vary for H and L, we generally think these costs will be the same.) 
  If the left ratio in (3) is less than the right ratio, then if  ￿ lies between the two, the individual will 
substitute a generic for L, but buy brand-name H.  In such a world, we would see more prescriptions filled 
by generics accompanied by higher average brand-name prices.  In other words, if brand-name H drugs 
are perceived to offer much greater quality gains over generics than do brand-name L drugs, more 
generics will mean higher brand-name copays on average.  The converse implication is also true.  
   The actual relationship between generic scrip share and brand prices is an empirical issue and the 
focus of this paper.  The following section clarifies the hypotheses we test. 
 
III.  HYPOTHESES   
One central question motivates the hypotheses that we will set forth:  what factors are most 
important in determining whether consumers or their physicians decide to purchase a generic or brand-
name drug?   While the consumer-doctor dyad chooses the drug, the health plan influences their choice 
through both copayment arrangements and the drugs it lists on the formulary.  Moreover, we assume that 
the combination of market forces plus some extension of the Hippocratic Oath assure that the health plans   17 
are reasonably reliable agents for their patients.   Presumably, since the health plan offers both brand-
name drugs and generic substitutes for them when available, it believes there is little or no difference in 
quality between a brand-name drug and generic alternatives.  In some cases, and almost always when 
brand-name drugs have gone off patent, the two drugs have precisely the same formulation.  One example 
is Capoten, a brand-name antihypertensive drug and its generic equivalent, captopril.  In other 
circumstances, the generic and brand-name drugs are considered therapeutically equivalent, but may 
differ in ingredients or mechanism of action.  An example would be the branded antihypertensive drug 
Lotensin, still under patent, and the generic antihypertensive captopril. 
Our principal hypotheses assume that the patient selects drugs utilizing a decision model in the 
spirit of the one spelled out in Section II.  The hypotheses apply equally well if the physician is the 
predominant decision maker or a collaborative decision maker, assuming that the physician is acting as an 
effective agent for the patient.  Such a doctor will take account of both the patient’s copays and his 
concern about drug quality.  
Our first hypothesis is that differences in generic scrip share are primarily driven by differences in 
costs consumers face for brand-name drugs across geographic areas, e.g., because of variability  in 
insurance plans across areas.  When consumers face high out-of-pocket costs for such drugs, both 
substitution and income effects will encourage them to buy more generics.   
Hypothesis I:  Differences in brand-name prices to consumers drive generic use. The higher are the 
out-of-pocket costs for brand-name drugs, the more generics a consumer will purchase.  Hence, looking 
across geographic areas, there will be a positive relationship between the average brand-name prices to a 
consumer and the likelihood that he purchases a generic drug.  This will be particularly true if most brand-
name drugs – weighted by volume of use – on a plan have similar or identical copays.     18 
Our second consumer welfare hypothesis is a compound hypothesis.  First, patients are more 
concerned with quality than with price.  Second, the price to consumers of a pharmaceutical is either an 
actual indicator or a perceived indicator of quality. 
Hypothesis II:  Quality matters greatly; brand-name prices indicates quality. Since consumers are 
more concerned with quality than price, and presume a positive correlation between the two, they will 
tend to substitute generics for those brand-name drugs whose price to them is low.  Hence, increased 
levels of generic scrip share – assumed to be caused by independent factors -- will be accompanied by a 
rise in the average brand-name price paid by consumers. 
Our third hypothesis is also compound.  First, drug companies market more expensive brand-name 
drugs more heavily -- whether to doctors or in direct-to-consumer advertising -- because there is more to 
gain from a single sale and from continued brand loyalty.  Second, health plans in effect set higher copays 
for more expensive brand-name drugs -- disproportionately those that are heavily advertised --  either to 
recoup costs or discourage their use.   
Hypothesis III:  Drug company advertising deters generic purchases. Drug companies will be 
highly reluctant to lose customers to generics for brand-name drugs with high prices.  Hence, they will 
differentially advertise those drugs, and thereby discourage sales of their generic substitutes.  Assuming 
that health plans set generic copays that vary positively with drug prices, generic drugs will substitute for 
lower-priced brand-name drugs, and greater generic scrip share will raise the average price of brand-name  
purchases.
31  
Implication of Hypotheses I-III.  Hypotheses I - III all predict that greater generic scrip share will 
be associated with higher average prices to consumers for brand-name drugs.  If that prediction is 
                                                 
31  This hypothesis would also apply if expensive brand drugs were advertised heavily before they went off patent, driving up 
brand loyalty and diminishing any shift in purchases due to generic entry.   19 
confirmed, we will have to find additional ways to distinguish among these hypotheses.  Our fourth 
hypothesis predicts the opposite relationship:   
Hypothesis IV: Brand-name prices to consumers matter greatly.  Consumers view the quality  
 





Implication of Hypothesis IV.   Hypothesis IV predicts that consumers will first substitute generics 
for the most expensive brand-name drugs.  This implies that the greater is generic scrip share, the lower 
will be average brand-name prices to consumers.  
Our secondary empirical concern, mentioned earlier, is to determine how the relation between 
generic scrip share and average brand-name prices to consumers translates into average brand-name 
prices for health plans.  To address this issue, we test Hypothesis P, where P stands for plan.  
Hypothesis P:  If generic scrip share lowers (raises) average brand price to the consumer, it will 
     lower (raise) the cost to health plans as well.   
 
Before testing these hypotheses, we describe our data and estimation approach. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
IV.  DATA AND ESTIMATION                                                                                                                          
Data 
 This study uses data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  This database, 
cosponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS), provides nationally representative estimates of medical treatments, 
pharmaceutical and other health care expenditures, health status, health insurance coverage, and 
sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics for the civilian, noninstitutionalized population in   20 
the United States.
32   Our sample includes adults aged 25-64, and covers the period 1996-2001.  The 
MEPS validates information on medical care utilization by contacting health care providers and 
pharmacies identified by survey respondents.  
The MEPS data incorporates a number of surveys.  The MEPS Household Survey includes person-
year information on health care utilization and expenditures, and socioeconomic and demographic factors.  
To this basic file, we linked information from the MEPS Prescribed Medicines and Medical Conditions 
databases.  The Prescribed Medicines data includes drug-specific information on utilization, numbers of 
prescriptions filled, and both patient and insurer expenditures.  Because this database includes National 
Drug Codes (NDCs), a standardized product identifier for drugs for humans, we could distinguish 
between  brand-name and generic drugs.  The Medical Conditions data includes information on specific 
illnesses, which allowed us to identify drug use for common medical conditions.  Using these databases, 
we are able to construct measures of annual numbers of prescriptions filled, out-of-pocket prices per drug, 
and patient costs for all brand-name and generic drugs in the database.    
   The MEPS database has a complex survey design which, beyond stratifying by sampling units, 
includes clustering, and oversampling of certain subgroups such as minorities.  Therefore, all our 
statistical analyses use weights provided in MEPS to correct mean values.   
Estimation 
  We estimate empirical models relating the proportion of prescriptions filled by generics to 
consumer out-of-pocket prices for brand-name drugs, net brand-name prices paid by the insurer (i.e., the 
insurer’s cost less the copay), and overall brand-name prices.  In addition to generic scrip shares, our 
                                                 
    32  The MEPS sample was chosen as a nationally representative sub sample of the ongoing National Heath Interview   Survey 
(NHIS) conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics.  It is able to be  linked to the NHIS database as well.   The MEPS 
survey respondents were interviewed in person. The surveys achieve response rates of about 75%.  See Cohen, Joel , Monheit, 
Alan , and Beauregard, Karen. “The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: A National Health Information Resource.”  Inquiry 33 
no. 4 (1996): 373-389 for further details. 
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models control for a variety of sociodemographic and health status measures that could affect the average 
purchase price of drugs.  
  The generic scrip share is endogenous; it is determined by some of the same factors that determine 
the average price of a brand-name drug to a patient.  To overcome the resulting identification problem, we 
need to find instruments for generic scrip share.  Thus we estimate a two-equation structural model.  In 
the first stage of this model, we estimate the individual’s generic scrip share as a function of both a vector 
of sociodemographic and health factors, and of several instruments that help to predict generic scrip share: 
 
(5)  lnGENSCRIPSHR = ￿ + ￿SOCIODEM  + ￿HEALTH  +  ￿Z + ￿, 
where 
 
lnGENSCRIPSHR  =  natural logarithm of scrips filled for generics divided by  
        total scrips filled by the consumer; 
 
SOCIODEM   =  a vector of socioeconomic and demographic factors; 
 
HEALTH    =  a vector of health status measures; 
 
Z  =   a vector of instruments that help identify the generic scrip share equations; 
 
￿, ￿, ￿, ￿,    =   coefficients to be estimated; and 
 
￿,      =  an error term. 
 
  The predicted values of lnGENSCRIPSHR will be used as an explanatory variable in second-stage 
price equations: 
 
(6)  lnBRDPRICE = ￿ + ￿lnGENSCRIPSHR  +  ￿SOCIODEM  +  
 




lnBRDPRICE   =  the natural logarithm of the average price of brand drugs; 
   22 
 
￿, ￿, ￿, ￿    =  coefficients to be estimated; 
￿      =  an error term;  
and other variables are as defined above.  Similar equations will be estimated for the average price of 
brand-name drugs paid for by the insurer (lnINSBRDPRICE) and by the consumer (lnSLFBRDPRICE). 
Variables 
  Instruments.  To avoid including endogenous factors in generic scrip share as an independent 
variable, we estimate that quantity using instrumental variables.  Proper instruments will allow us to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of generic scrip share on the average price of brand-name drugs.  
Our choice of instruments include market-level measures of scrip share, and demographic characteristics 
that may reflect an individual’s preferences for or access to generic drugs.  Our first instrument is the 
share of generic scrips in the subject’s market area.  We expect market share to be positively related to 
individual generic scrip shares.
33  Although MEPS does not reveal geographic locations, the MEPS 
database is drawn from approximately 200 distinct, primary sampling units, which are identified by 
number.  These units are counties or clusters of contiguous counties, and are stratified by census region 
and state urban status, and sociodemographic characteristics.
34  Given this feature of MEPS, we are able 
to construct market-level measures of particular variables of interest, such as the generic scrip share in the 
market.   These shares should be larger, for example, in markets located in states with laws that encourage 
generic substitution.  A market-level measure of generic scrip share provides a proxy for such laws.    
                                                 
33 One might argue that market-level measures of generic scrip share will affect brand prices directly, perhaps because 
producers of brand-name drugs have less ability to negotiate favorable prices in markets where generic scrip share is greater.  
As shown in Appendix B, however, we find no evidence of such direct effects of generic scrip share on the prices of brand-
name drugs.   
34  See Cohen, Joel.  “Sample Design of the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component.”  MEPS 
Methodology Report No. 2 AHCPR Pub. No. 97-0027.  Rockville, MD: Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (1997).   23 
A variety of research has found that consumers’ attitudes toward generic drugs differ by age, 
education, race, and ethnicity.
35  For example, Kendall et al.
36 report that older consumers were less 
willing to substitute generic drugs when offered the choice.  Perhaps they are more resistant to changing 
to newer drug alternatives.  Possibly they are more wary about the quality of generics.  Perri et al.
37 note 
for example that consumers over age fifty were more concerned about the side effects of generics. 
Education-specific differences in information about generics may affect people’s choices.  In a 
similar vein, race and ethnicity may affect generic scrip share if such differences reflect different 
information sets, access to or susceptibility to advertisements for brand-name drugs, or confidence in the 
quality of generics.  Minorities and subjects with less education have generally been found to have more 
negative attitudes toward generics, implying that they would use them less.
38  Yet, these groups also tend 
to have fewer resources, which may tilt toward generics.   
This evidence suggests that variables measuring subject’s age, education, race and ethnicity may 
usefully predict generic drug use.  In contrast, there is little reason to expect these variables to have a 
strong independent effect on price, especially when one controls for income and health status, as our 
empirical models do.  To illustrate, in preliminary empirical testing we found that age was strongly 
negatively related to generic scrip share, but we found no evidence that it had a direct effect on any of the 
price measures we consider.  Thus, age performs well as an instrument.  Similarly, preliminary statistical 
testing revealed that education as well as race-and-ethnicity indicators were strongly associated with 
generic scrip share, but had little direct relation to prices, implying that they too are effective instruments.   
                                                 
35 See Gaither et al., supra note 26. 
36 See Kendall Kenneth W., Ng S, Schoner, Bertram.”  “Consumer Response to Generic/chemically Equivalent Drugs.”  
Journal of Public Policy Marketing 10 (1991): 182-201. 
37 See Perri, Matthew,  Wolfgang A, Janket C.  (1990).  “Georgia Consumers'  Awareness and Perceptions of Generic Drugs 
after the Scandals.”  American Pharmacy NS30 no. 10 (1990): 33-36. 
38  See Gaither et al., supra note 26.   24 
  Our main results use the market level measure of generic scrip share and age as the sole 
instruments.  These results are compared with those using, respectively, education and race-and-ethnicity 
measures instead of age as instruments, and then regressions that include all of these instruments, to check 
the robustness of our findings. 
  Sociodemographic variables.  In addition to age, education, race and ethnicity, sociodemographic 
factors include gender, income, marital status, and health insurance status.   These variables are intended 
to capture differences in information, preferences, and ability to pay for pharmaceutical treatments.  We 
also include dummy variables indicating census region and urban/rural status of subject’s residence, to 
capture geographic factors that might affect the availability and mix of generics as well as average prices.  
Year dummies are employed to control for intertemporal changes in nominal prices.   
  Health measures.  Health indicators include the subject’s self-assessed health status and binary 
variables for twelve common medical conditions.  Table 1 provides the names, descriptions, and summary 
statistics of the variables used in this analysis.     
(INSERT TABLE 1) 
 
V.  RESULTS 
          We begin with simple correlations between generic scrip share and the average price of 
prescriptions filled with brand-name drugs.  As Table 2 indicates, generic scrip share is unrelated to the 
price paid by insurers.  In contrast, we find a negative and highly significant correlation between generic 
scrip share and consumer out-of-pocket prices for brand-name drugs. The correlation between scrip share 
and overall price is also negative and significant, though the magnitude of this association is less than 
40% as large as for out-of-pocket prices. 
(INSERT TABLE 2)   25 
          The patterns revealed from these simple correlations are consistent with our Hypothesis IV, namely 
that consumers choose generic drugs to lower their out-of-pocket costs for the mix of brand-name drugs 
they do purchase.  Consider, for example, a consumer who purchases two brand-name drugs, one with an 
out-of-pocket cost of $10 and one with an out-of-pocket cost of $25.  If he substitutes a generic for the 
$25 drug, but not the $10 drug, he will produce the pattern we observe: more generic scrips and a lower 
average brand-name price.   
         An alternative explanation for the negative correlation we observe is that it is an artifact of a range 
of econometric issues, such as selection effects, implying that the pattern should vanish in multivariate 
analyses that deal with identification issues.  We turn now to conduct those analyses. 
Multivariate evidence 
         Two-stage least squares estimates predicting generic market share indicate that the instruments we 
used -- market-level measures of generic scrip share and subject’s age -- performed well. (See Appendix 
A.)  Age in particular has a strong and highly significant negative effect on generic scrip share.  
         Do increases in the share of scrips that consumers fill with generics affect the average price that 
consumers pay for brand-name drugs?  Table 3, which shows the results of the structural model described 
above, indicates that a higher generic scrip share produces a large and statistically significant decline in 
consumers’ out-of-pocket prices.  In particular, a 10% increase in generic scrip share produces a 15.6% 
decline in the average consumer’s out-of-pocket cost per scrip for the remaining brand-name drugs.  In 
contrast, we find no statistically significant effect of scrip share on the average net prices to insurers.  
Overall prices decline significantly, overwhelmingly because of the strong negative effect on consumers’ 
out-of-pocket costs.  These multivariate results are consistent with the simple correlations presented 
above.     26 
       The effects of generic scrip share were much smaller for insurers than for consumers, and statistically 
insignificant.  Insurers may be able to promote generic choice so as to reduce their overall prescription 
costs, but they prove unable to simultaneously lower the average cost to themselves of the brand-name 
drugs that are purchased.  This is not surprising given that the out-of-pocket drug costs per scrip and 
insurer costs per scrip are negatively correlated (rho = -0.22; p<0.0001).
39  But the far larger percentage 
reductions in out-of-pocket cost savings to consumers may also reflect the structure of multi-tiered 
insurance for prescribed medicines, as well as the fact that percentage differences in prices among brand-
name drugs are typically small relative to differences in prices between brand-names and generics.   
         To illustrate, consider a typical three-tiered plan, in which the consumer must pay $5 if he selects a 
generic, $10 if he selects a preferred brand drug, and $25 if he chooses a brand drug that is not preferred.  
For ease of exposition, assume that this consumer currently purchases 1 preferred brand-name drug (total 
price $80) and 1 non-preferred brand-name drug (total price $120).  Suppose that this consumer then 
substitutes a generic drug for the non-preferred brand-name drug.  Then this consumer’s average out-of-
pocket price for brand drugs will fall substantially in percentage terms – from $17.50 to $10, or a 43% 
decline.  But the percentage reduction in terms of average net brand-name prices paid by the insurer will 
be much less, from $82.50 – i.e., ($80-$10 + $120 - $25)/2 -- to $70, or just a 15% reduction. 
         Other results indicate that people in better overall health and people with public insurance buy a less 
expensive mix of brand-name drugs.  Women buy a less expensive mix as well; precisely why is not clear.   
It may reflect their tendency to use health care, including drug therapy, more extensively (Center on an 
Aging Society 2002),
40 while males may tend to restrict drug treatments to more serious conditions, which 
tend to require more expensive pharmaceuticals.   
                                                 
39 In contrast, overall price and out-of-pocket cost per scrip are strongly positively correlated (rho = 0.76; p<0.0001). 
40 See Center on an Aging Society.   “Prescription Drugs: A Vital Component of Health Care.”  Washington DC:  Georgetown 
University (2002).   
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(INSERT TABLE 3) 
         The results of a number of alternative specifications are summarized in Table 4.  These alternative 
estimates employ different sets of instruments from the age, education, and race and ethnicity variables 
discussed above.  Thus they provide a sense of the robustness of our results to alternative structural model 
specifications. The first column in the table estimates the effects of generic scrip share using the same 
models reported in Table 3.  Column 2 (2SLS II) uses educational attainment measures instead of age as 
instruments, while column 3 (2SLS III) uses race and ethnicity measures.  Column 4 (2SLS IV) uses all of 
these variables as instruments (e.g., the market-level measure of generic scrip share, age, educational 
attainment, race, and ethnicity).   
(INSERT TABLE 4) 
         The results of these alternative models are strongly consistent.  In each case, generic scrip share has 
a strong negative relationship with consumers’ out-of-pocket costs.  In contrast, the estimated effects on 
prices paid by insurers are substantially smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant in all models. 
The effect on out-of-pocket costs is strong enough that it leads to significantly lower overall prices as 
well.   
Tests of Hypotheses.  These results lead us to reject Hypotheses I-III, since the implication of 
those hypotheses was refuted.  The results strongly support the implication of Hypothesis IV, thus 
providing evidence for it. Brand-name prices to consumers matter greatly.  
Since we did not examine consumers’ decisions directly, e.g., by observing how they traded off 
quality and cost, some other explanation could conceivably be found for the pattern we observe.  In   28 
contrast, though we find some evidence that is consistent with Hypothesis P, these findings are 
statistically insignificant in all specifications.
41   
          Finally, the last column provides ordinary least squares (OLS) results.  These results are also 
consistent with the 2SLS estimates, though the estimated magnitudes are considerably smaller in absolute 
value.  This could reflect two factors.  First, measurement error in the generic scrip share may be greater 
in the OLS estimates, which would bias the estimated coefficient downward.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, consumers facing higher prices for brand-name drugs may use fewer of them, leading to a 
higher generic scrip share.  This “reverse-causation” effect would bias OLS results toward finding a 
positive association between scrip share and average brand-name price.  In short, OLS methods can not 
reliably answer our primary questions.  Our instrumental variables approach is designed to overcome this 
upward bias, and indeed we find a stronger negative association in all of the estimates using this method.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION   
   This paper sought to gain a fuller understanding of how generic scrip share affects the price of 
brand-name drugs consumers buy.  Most previous research has established that competition from generics 
does not induce producers of brand-name drugs to lower their prices (a finding that we reinforce), but it 
has not considered how consumer choices might influence the average prices of the brand-name drugs 
consumers do buy.  Since generics enable consumers to avoid buying the brand-name drugs they pay the 
most for, that effect could be substantial, and so it proves to be.  We find that the average price paid by 
consumers for brand-name drugs falls substantially when generic scrip share rises: a 10% increase in 
consumers’ generic scrip share is associated with a 15.6% decline in the average price paid for brand-
name drugs by consumers.  The patterns we observe are consistent with a model where consumers value 
                                                 
41  See Appendix B2.  It explains a bias introduced because brand-name drugs without generic substitutes sell for higher prices 
to insurers.  This bias makes it less likely that consumer choice will produce a negative correlation between generic scrip share   29 
the cost savings from generic purchases more than any perceived quality premiums offered by brand-
name drugs.  In contrast, we find little evidence that insurers have been able to change the mix of drugs 
purchased by consumers so as to lower their own average brand-name costs. 
Our results suggest that the potential cost savings to consumers from generic drugs may be far 
greater than previous work might suggest.  Not only does the consumer benefit from the lower generic 
prices, but also the pattern of switching lowers the average purchase price of branded drugs.  Moreover, 
during the period of our analysis, the average generic scrip share across markets was only 43% - 47%,
42 
suggesting that generic substitution has considerable future potential to lower the average prices of brand-
name drugs.  
While our results suggest that legal and other barriers to further growth in generics merit even 
greater scrutiny, we must emphasize that our study is not a welfare analysis of the merits or consequences 
of generic drugs.  Regulators such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must weigh generic 
applications carefully; for some types of drugs, particularly those which are safe only within a narrow 
dosage range, quality considerations may be paramount.  An additional factor from a welfare perspective 
concerns whether increased purchases of generics will reduce the funds available for R&D, the vast 
majority of which are financed by producers of brand-name drugs.  This issue must also be considered in 
gauging the full social welfare effects of greater generic scrip share, particularly for a large nation that is 
also a major pharmaceutical manufacturer.  
Despite the evidence suggesting that consumers and their physicians face substantial information 
deficits about the prices of alternative drugs, the present study indicates that where consumers generate a 
greater use of generics, they adjust their prescription portfolios to lower the average prices they pay for 
brand-name drugs.   
                                                                                                                                                                            
and average brand-name cost to insurers. 
42  See Pharmaceutical and Research Manufacturers of America, supra note 1.   30 
As the nation grapples with the problem of controlling escalating health care costs, market-driven 
versus centralized approaches are being increasingly debated.  To better inform this debate, evidence is 
needed on the effectiveness of alternative approaches at achieving cost control.  The present study 
provides evidence that consumers choose generic over brand name drugs where they save the most 
money.               31 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ %￿￿￿￿￿!&￿!’￿ (￿￿￿$￿￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!’￿￿￿￿"#)￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿#￿%&￿￿￿%￿￿(￿￿￿#￿￿*￿ (￿￿￿!"￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿+￿,-￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿-.￿
￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ %￿￿￿￿￿!&￿!’￿ (￿￿￿"#￿$￿#%￿￿￿￿!"￿%￿￿￿/￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿!’￿￿0￿￿0￿￿"#￿ %￿￿￿￿!"￿&￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+￿12￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+1￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ %￿￿￿￿￿!&￿!’￿ (￿￿￿"￿%￿￿￿/￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿!’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿0￿￿"#￿ %￿￿￿￿!"￿&￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1￿42￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5.￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"6￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ %￿￿￿￿￿!&￿!’￿ (￿￿￿$￿￿￿&￿￿￿!"￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿(￿￿￿￿!’￿￿0￿￿0￿￿"#￿ %￿￿￿￿!"￿&￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿￿8￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ )￿￿￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿9+￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿"6￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿:￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ %￿￿￿￿￿!&￿!’￿ (￿￿￿$￿￿￿&￿￿￿!"￿%￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿"#￿ %￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿"￿￿￿￿￿#￿%&￿￿"￿ (￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ).￿,2￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿-￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿"￿6￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿ %￿￿￿￿￿!&￿!’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿￿&￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿9,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿15￿
￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿.￿.-￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿++￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿3￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿")￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.2￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+1￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! (￿￿￿"!")=(￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.1￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿4￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿"￿(￿&(￿￿￿(!!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.4￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿14￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿  ￿"#￿7￿￿￿% ￿#￿#￿"! ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿#%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿.￿.2￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿  ￿"#￿#￿￿!￿￿￿&￿￿￿% ￿#￿#￿"! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿#%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿14￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿41￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿&￿￿&￿￿#%￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿9￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+-￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿  ￿"#￿#￿&￿￿#%￿ ￿￿￿￿(!!￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.￿+￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿#%￿￿*￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿>￿￿?￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿"￿%￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.2￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿++￿
￿ ￿







￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿￿"￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ (￿"￿A￿.￿...￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿




￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿.￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+￿￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+.5.:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿￿"￿!￿￿￿A+.8￿)￿A5.8￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿1+￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4+￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿5.:￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿￿"￿!￿￿￿A5.8￿￿"#￿%￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿5+￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿5.￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿ ￿.￿9+￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿44￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿73￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿(￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿.￿￿9￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+2￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  34 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿76￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿(￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿&!!#￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿.￿+9￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4,￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿7￿6￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿(￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿$￿￿*￿&!!#￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿+1￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿45￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿7￿B￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ /￿￿(￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿￿0￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.,￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿15￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿(*￿￿￿ ￿"￿￿!"￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿.￿1-￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿45￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿#￿#￿￿!￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+1￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿ (*￿!￿#￿#￿￿!￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿1,￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿.￿.9￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿19￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ !￿*￿#￿￿!￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿11￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿#￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿.￿.9￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿1,￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿B￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿"0￿￿ *￿#￿￿!￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+￿￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿33￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿’’￿￿ ￿$￿￿#￿￿!￿#￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿.1￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿4￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿! (￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿#￿￿!￿#￿￿￿￿





￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿(￿￿#￿￿(￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+1￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿C￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿(￿!"￿￿￿;!￿" ￿￿￿￿"￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿5￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+9￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿:￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿(￿!"￿￿￿￿￿￿8￿￿￿￿"￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿9￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+,￿
￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿#=￿￿ ￿￿￿"￿%￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿!"￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿15￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4+￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿"￿￿!% (￿￿￿"￿%￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿!"￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿+9￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿42￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿D￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿"￿D￿￿ ￿￿￿"￿%￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿&￿!"￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿.￿￿2￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4.￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿￿%￿;￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿￿￿￿"￿￿￿ ￿!￿!￿￿ ￿"￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿,.￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿41￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿229￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿229￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿5￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4.￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿22,￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿22,￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿9￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+-￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿222￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿222￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿9￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+-￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1...￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1...￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿-￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿+5￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1..￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿￿￿￿’￿*￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1..￿￿￿￿￿￿￿<￿.￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.￿￿,￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿4￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
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    ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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Table A1.  Generic Scrip Share Equation Estimate 
                   (2SLS; n= 16,609) 
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Appendix B: Alternative potential effects of generic substitution on brand price                                                                                                                                                          
B1.  Generic scrip share and the prices charged for brand-name drugs.  
A second question that arises is whether generic scrip share affects the prices companies charge for brand-
name drugs.  We investigated this issue by including the market-level measure of generic scrip share -- 
GENSCRIPSHRMKT--  directly in the price equations.  The results, provided in Appendix Table B2 below, 
indicate that GENSCRIPSHRMKT had no statistically significant effect on any of the price measures.   That 
individual generic scrip share has a strong negative effect on out-of-pocket costs and overall price independent of 
market-level scrip share indicates that this result does not simply reflect regional variations in scrip shares and 
prices.  
 
B2.  Relationship between brand-name prices and the presence of generic competitors. 
A relationship between the prices of brand-name drugs and the presence of generic competitors might help 
to explain our results.  For example, if those branded drugs that face generic competition had higher prices than 
branded drugs with no generic competitors, the negative association between generic scrip share and brand prices 
might simply reflect this price differential.  To investigate this issue, we compared the overall prices, insurer prices, 
and consumer out-of-pocket prices for 25 commonly dispensed branded drugs that faced generic competition with 
25 major branded drugs that did not face generic competition (the names and frequencies of scrips filled with these 
drugs is provided in Appendix Table B1).  We found that branded drugs that faced generic competition had lower 
average prices than branded drugs with no generic competitors.
43,44  To the extent this is the case, our estimated 
results are biased against finding a negative association between generic scrip share and the price of brand-name 
drugs, providing a strong test of the hypothesis that a greater generic scrip share leads to lower prices for brand-
name drugs.  We also found that the both the percentage and absolute difference between prices for brand-name 
drugs without and with generic competition was greater for insurers than for consumers.  That is, average net  
prices paid by insurers were substantially higher for brand drugs that did not face generic competition ($63 versus 
$48 or 31% higher),  while the equivalent average out-of-pocket costs to consumers were more modestly higher 
($11 versus $9 or 22%).  Thus, the bias against finding a negative relationship between scrip share and brand-name 
prices is greater for insurer prices, which could help explain the weaker negative association between generic scrip 
share and insurer prices.  In any event, our results in the text strongly suggest that increases in generic scrip share 
substantially lower consumers’ out-of- pocket costs and that this estimated relationship is a conservative one.   
 
 
                                                 
43 The drugs examined are used to treat major conditions.  Branded drugs with and without generic competitors were compared.  
Brand-name prices for drugs with generic competitors continued to be lower in multivariate regressions that controlled for 
medical conditions for which the drug in question was used.    
44  We are only able to observe brand and generic drug prices for drugs actually purchased.  Conceivably, the brand-name 
prices faced by people who selected the generic alternative may have been higher than the brand-name prices for those who 
bought the bran.  Including this information, were it available, might reduce price disparities between branded drugs with and 
without generic competitors.     40 
 
Table B1.  Generic Scrip share in the Market and  the Price of  Brand-name drugs* 
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Table B2.  Brand-name drugs used in comparisons of prices by generic competition status 
￿
Brand-name drugs used in comparisons of prices by generic competition status 
Combined datasets 
   
 
Brand-name drugs without generic competition 
 
Brand-name  # scrips  % of scrips 
Accupril  7,202  6.5 
Altace  2,657  2.4 
Avandia  2,643  2.4 
Azmacort  1,855  1.7 
Celebrex  5,315  4.8 
Celexa  1,944  1.7 
Claritin  9,580  8.6 
Effexor  1,427  1.3 
Glucophage XR  186  0.2 
Glucotrol XL  3,939  3.5 
Imitrex  1,754  1.6 
Lescol  3,520  3.2 
Lipitor  21,138  19.0 
Lotensin  4,984  4.5 
Monopril  2,389  2.1 
Plendil  2,258  2.0 
Pravachol  662  0.6 
Paxil  7,927  7.1 
Theolair-SR  98  0.1 
Toprol XL  4,205  3.8 
Verelan PM  43  0.0 
Vioxx  4,023  3.6 
Wellbutrin SR  1,290  1.2 
Zocor  13,826  12.4 
Zyrtec  6,679  6.0 
   42 
Table B2, cont. 
 
Brand-name drugs with generic competition 
 
Brand-name  # scrips  % of scrips 
Adalat CC  2,812  3.3 
Aldactone  454  0.5 
Buspar  2,280  2.7 
Capoten  926  1.1 
Corgard  294  0.3 
Daypro  1,883  2.2 
Elavil  796  0.9 
Glucotrol  1,128  1.3 
Klonopin  948  1.1 
Lodine  1,058  1.2 
Lasix  3,233  3.8 
Lopressor  1,468  1.7 
Lozol  588  0.7 
Mevacor  2,510  2.9 
Micronase  793  0.9 
Prinivil  6,261  7.3 
Proventil  2,478  2.9 
Prozac  10,159  11.9 
Provera  2,305  2.7 
Synthroid  18,408  21.6 
Tenormin  1,440  1.7 
Ventolin  2,713  3.2 
Vasotec  6,750  7.9 
Xanax  1,482  1.7 
Zestril  12,202  14.3 
 